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I. INTRODUCTION
Humberto Fernandez-Vargas is a citizen of Mexico who has
illegally entered into the United States several times.' He was
* J.D. Candidate, University of Miami, 2008; B.A. University of Illinois Urbana-
Champaign, 2002. I would like to thank Professor David Abraham for his critique of
this note, my parents Krystyna and Bogdan for their continuous support, as well as
my friends and the members of the Inter-American Law Review.
1. Fernandez-Vargas v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 881, 883 (10th Cir. 2005).
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deported back to Mexico on numerous occasions.2 Finally, starting
in 1982, he was able to remain undetected in Utah, where he
started a trucking business.3 Mr. Fernandez-Vargas fathered an
American child in 1989 and in 2001 married the child's mother, a
U.S. citizen.4 Following his marriage, Mr. Fernandez-Vargas
applied for an adjustment of his legal status to one of a legal per-
manent resident.5 But instead of adjusting of his status, the U.S.
Government, acting pursuant to section 305(a)(5) of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)6
enacted in 1996, reinstated his 1981 deportation order and
removed Mr. Fernandez-Vargas to Mexico.'
On June 22, 2006, the United States Supreme Court upheld
the deportation, stating that IIRIRA was not impermissibly retro-
active as it did not affect any right nor impose any burden on Mr.
Fernandez-Vargas.9 Arguably, the Supreme Court felt the pres-
sures surrounding national immigration policy and misapplied
common principles of statutory interpretation. The Court incor-
rectly concluded that IIRIRA did not affect rights or impose bur-
dens on illegal aliens. This decision has an enormous impact on
many American families, many of which will be broken apart and
separated due to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
IIRIRA.
This casenote addresses and scrutinizes the statutory inter-
pretation applied by the majority of the Supreme Court. It argues
2. See id.
3. Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. 2422, 2427 (2006).
4. See id.
5. See id. Mr. Fernandez-Vargas's wife filed a relative-visa petition on behalf of
her husband pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154(a)-(b) (2000), which allowed him to file an
application to adjust his status to that of a lawful permanent resident under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255(i) (2000). See id.
6. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, § 305(a)(5), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 599 (1996) (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. §1231 (2002)).
7. Under IIRIRA, deportation proceedings are now called removal proceedings.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(2).
8. See Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2427. At the time of the application filing,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service fined Mr. Fernandez-Vargas $1,000 for
entering the United States without inspection but, nonetheless, accepted his
application for adjustment. See Brief of Petitioner at 17, Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S.
Ct. 2422 (2006) (No. 04-1376). On November 1, 2003, Mr. Fernandez-Vargas
appeared at the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Service (BCIS) for a routine
interview regarding his petition. See id. at 18. He was arrested by the Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICEO) officials and subsequently, on
September 9, 2004, deported to Juarez, Mexico. See id.
9. See Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2427. In an 8-1 decision, Justice Stevens
was the lone dissenter. See id. at 2434 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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that the history of immigration and deportation statutes, com-
bined with the nature of the consequences that flow from IIRIRA
indicates that Congress did not intend to apply the statute retro-
actively. It also criticizes Supreme Court's analysis of the sub-
stantial rights and liabilities that the retroactive applicability of
IIRIRA creates. The note concludes by addressing the doctrine of
legal fiction, which the Supreme Court relied on in labeling depor-
tation as a civil rather than a criminal proceeding.
The statute at issue, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), as enacted by
IIRIRA, does not explicitly state if it should apply to all illegal
reentrants that entered the United States before its enactment. It
provides:
If the Attorney General finds that an alien has reentered
the United States illegally after having been removed or
having departed voluntarily, under an order of removal, the
prior order of removal is reinstated from its original date
and is not subject to being reopened or reviewed, the alien
is not eligible and may not apply for any relief under this
chapter, and the alien shall be removed under the prior
order at any time after the reentry.1"
II. PERSPECTIVE
A. The History of the Immigration Naturalization Act
In 1952, Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA), which the newly enacted IIRIRA replaced in 1996. The
INA provided:
Should the Attorney General find that any alien has unlaw-
fully reentered the United States after having previously
departed or been deported pursuant to an order of deporta-
tion, whether before or after the date of enactment of this
Act [June 27, 1952], on any ground described in any of the
paragraphs enumerated in subsection (e) [of this section],
the previous order of deportation shall be deemed to be
reinstated from its original date and such alien shall be
departed under such previous order at any time subsequent
to such reentry.11
The 1952 version of the statute differed from the present stat-
10. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2000).
11. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414, § 242(f), 66 Stat. 163, 212
(1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f) (1996)), repealed by Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 306(a)(2), 110 Stat. 3009, 548 (1996) (emphasis added).
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ute mainly due to the inclusion of the "before or after" phrase.
Unlike the IIRIRA provision, which applies to every individual,
the older version applied to a specific narrow group of aliens.12
The 1952 version also allowed for certain discretionary adjust-
ment of status if the alien met certain conditions. 1
Overall, the 1952 statute explicitly stated retroactive applica-
bility, despite having reached into a much narrower group of indi-
viduals. The main goals of the 1952 statute were to reunify
families, to protect the domestic labor force, and to promote the
immigration of people with sought-after skills. 4 Although Con-
gress amended the 1952 statute many times since its enactment,
the alien's ability to adjust his or her status has remained
constant."'
B. The Formation of IIRIRA in Congress
Congress enacted IIRIRA in 1996, acting pursuant to general
public sentiment that immigration should be reduced. 6 Many
members of Congress had emphasized anti-immigrant rhetoric
during their election campaigns."' In addition, some Americans
blamed illegal immigrants for taking jobs from American workers
and reducing overall wages for Americans. s
Although Congress clearly desired to enact laws that would
curb and discourage illegal immigration, it must have been aware
that retroactive applicability of any such laws would have a large
scale effect. The current version of IIRIRA section 241(a)(5)
originated in the House of Representatives and mirrors the
enacted version, as it did not include the "before or after" clause
that was present in the 1952 version. 9 The Senate version of the
statute, however, included the "before or after" clause, which illus-
trated that it believed the statute should be retroactively
12. See Brief of Petitioner at 3-4, Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S. Ct. 2422 (2006) (No.
04-1376). The narrow group of aliens that the statute applied to included persons
who had been deported for commission of an aggravated felony. See id.
13. See id.
14. See Jeffrey A. Bekiares, In Country, on Parole, Out of Luck-Regulating Away
Alien Eligibility for Adjustment of Status Contrary to Congressional Intent and Sound
Immigration Policy, 58 FLA. L. REV. 713, 718 (2006).
15. See id.
16. See Alexander Tsesis, Toward a Just Immigration Policy: Putting Ethics into
Immigration Law, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 105, 106 (1999).
17. See id.
18. See id. at 107.
19. See H.R. REP. No. 104-469(I), at 26 (1996).
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applied.20 In order to eliminate the discrepancies, the "before or
after" clause that the Senate proposed was removed from enacted
IIRIRA section 241(a)(5).
C. The Interpretation of Section 241(a)(5) of IIRIRA
by Various Circuits
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision, circuit courts of appeal
struggled with the interpretation of the scope of section 241(a)(5).
Two circuits have held that section 241(a)(5) did not apply to all
aliens who reentered the United States prior to the statute's effec-
tive date. In Bejjani v. INS,21 a Lebanese national and lawful per-
manent resident of the United States pled guilty to a charge of
possession with intent to distribute 650 grams of heroin.2 Faced
with a deportation proceeding, Mr. Bejjani voluntarily left the
United States. 23 He returned to the United States using an inva-
lid Alien Registration Card, thus illegally and fraudulently reen-
tering the country. 24 The Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) attempted to reinstate the order of deportation issued in
1992, pursuant to section 241(a)(5) of the IIRIRA. 25 The Sixth Cir-
cuit held that the INS could not reinstate Bejjani's 1992 deporta-
tion order because section 241(a)(5) could only be applied to
reentries that occurred after IIRIRA's effective date.26
The Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Castro-Cor-
tez v. INS.27 Faced with deportation, an illegal alien voluntarily
left the country and subsequently illegally reentered the United
States.2' He married an American citizen and fathered two chil-
dren, both of whom were born in the United States. 29 The court
concluded that Congress clearly intended that the statute should
not be applied retroactively to aliens whose reentry occurred prior
20. See S. REP. No. 104-249, at 118 (1996), 1996 WL 180026. Unlike the House
version, which applied to broad number of aliens, the scope of the Senate version was
similar to the 1952 version as it applied to limited number of aliens. See id.
21. Bejjani v. INS, 271 F.3d 670, 672 (6th Cir. 2001).




26. See id. at 689.
27. See Castro-Cortez v. INS , 239 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 2001). Castro-Cortez
was a consolidated case of five petitioners, all in similar situation, faced with
reinstatement of a former deportation order under newly enacted IIRIRA, despite
reentering the United States prior to its enactment. See id. at 1040-1043.
28. See id. at 1041.
29. Id.
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to its enactment. °
In Alvarez-Portillo v. Ashcroft,3' the Eighth Circuit concluded
that under the law prior to IIRIRA, aliens had a reasonable expec-
tation that they could apply for a discretionary adjustment of sta-
tus, or wait and preserve that defense during a deportation
proceeding.3 2 Alvarez-Portillo was deported from the United
States in 1993, but decided to illegally reenter the country only
twelve days later. He married an American citizen in 1996, but
did not apply for an adjustment of status until 2001. 3' Refusing to
recognize Congress's express intent that section 241(a)(5) should
be applied only proactively,35 the court concluded that because
Portillo's marriage occurred prior to the effective date of IIRIRA,
he had a reasonable expectation to rely on prior law, which
allowed him discretionary adjustment of status. 6
Three circuits, however, have refused to apply IIRIRA retro-
actively against those aliens who applied for an adjustment of sta-
tus before the effective date of the statute.37  These circuits
concluded that applying IIRIRA retroactively would attach new
legal consequences to aliens' pending applications, thus giving
IIRIRA an impermissible retroactive effect. 5
D. The History of the Supreme Court's Interpretation
of Retroactive Statutes
The Supreme Court has faced the issue of statutory retroac-
tive applicability on numerous occasions. The jurisprudential tra-
dition against retroactive legislation dates back to the early days
of the Supreme Court. As early as 1829, Justice Marshall stated
that the presumption against retroactivity is a principle that has
always been held sacred in the United States. 9 Laws which regu-
30. See id. at 1051.
31. Alvarez-Portillo v. Ashcroft, 280 F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 2002).
32. See id. at 867.
33. Id. at 861.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 864.
36. See id. at 866- 867. The Eight Circuit relied on Hughes Aircraft Co. v. U.S. ex
rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939 (1997), where the Supreme Court concluded that a statute
that eliminated certain defenses would have an impermissible retroactive effect if
applied in a situation where the alleged tort occurred before the enactment of the
statute.
37. See Arevalo v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003); Faiz-Mohammad v.
Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 2005); Sarmiento Cisneros v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 381
F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2004).
38. See Arevalo, 344 F.3d at 16.
39. Reynolds v. McArthur, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 417, 434 (1829).
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late human action should look forward, not backwards. 4° Accord-
ingly, statutes should never be construed retrospectively unless
the language of the act renders such construction indispensable.41
In United States v. St. Louis, San Francisco & Texas Railway
Co.,42 the Supreme Court rejected retroactive applicability of a
three-year statute of limitations amendment to causes of action
that were pending at the time of the enactment of the amend-
ment.43 The Supreme Court strongly emphasized the general pre-
sumption against retroactive interpretation of statutes.44
Retroactive application, therefore, could only be permitted when
congressional intent was clearly manifested by explicit language
or by necessary implication. 45 After considering the plain lan-
guage and the history of the amendment, the Court concluded
that the new statute of limitations could not have been applied
retroactively.46
In Landgraf v. USI Film Products,41 the Supreme Court was
called upon to resolve the question of whether the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, which created a right to recover compensatory and puni-
tive damages for certain violations of Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, could be applied to events that occur prior to the stat-
ute's enactment.4" The plaintiff in Landgraf commenced a suit,
prior to the enactment of the 1991 amendments, against her
employer for alleged sexual discrimination violations. 49 After the
plaintiff failed to prevail at trial, and during the appeal process,
the 1991 amendment was enacted. 0 The plaintiff petitioned the
court to remand her case and re-try it according to the newly
enacted provisions.5
The Supreme Court applied a two-part test to analyze the ret-
roactive applicability of the 1991 Civil Rights Act.2 The first part
involved determining whether Congress expressly prescribed the
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. United States v. St. Louis, S.F. & Tex. Ry. Co., 270 U.S. 1 (1926).
43. See id. at 4.
44. See id. at 3.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
48. See id. at 247. The 1991 amendment also allowed any party to request a trial
by jury when these damages were sought. Id.
49. See id. at 248.
50. See id. at 249.
51. Id.
52. See id. at 280.
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statute's reach.53 If Congress had done so, the inquiry would end
and the intent of Congress would be applied.54 If, however, the
statute contained no such clear mandate, the court had to deter-
mine whether the new statute would have retroactive effect.55 If
retroactive effect existed, the presumption against retroactivity
required the court to give the newly enacted statute only a pro-
spective effect. 6
Under the first part of the test, the Supreme Court held that
Congress had not clearly expressed its intent as to the retroactive
reach of the 1991 Civil Rights Act. 7 Under the second part of the
test, the Court reasoned that applying the 1991 amendments to
pending cases would increase a defendant's liability for past con-
duct, which in turn would have a retroactive effect against the
defendant.8
Three years later, in Lindh v. Murphy,59 the Supreme Court
applied the Landgraf test to a newly enacted habeas corpus stat-
ute. The new habeas provision changed the standards of proof
and persuasion in a way more favorable to the state.60 The Court
concluded that the new provision affected the petitioner's substan-
tive entitlement for the relief.6 1 Under the first part of the Lan-
dgraf test, the Supreme Court compared other provisions of the
newly enacted statute and found that Congress clearly intended
only proactive application.62 Other provisions of the statute
clearly stated that they were applicable to pending cases, while
the provision in question did not. Such disparity in selected lan-
guage strongly suggested to the Court that Congress intended dif-
ferent treatment of various provisions it had enacted.64 The
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id. Retroactive effect exists when the newly enacted statute would impair
rights a party possessed when he acted, increased a party's liability for past conduct,
or impose new duties with respect to transactions already committed. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 286.
58. See id. at 283.
59. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997).
60. Id. at 327.
61. See id. at 327. The Court distinguished between procedural and substantive
laws, stating that purely procedural laws do not present problems of retroactivity.
See id. However, when the statute goes beyond mere procedure to affect substantive
entitlement to relief, it has effects of a substantive law and it presents similar
problems regarding retroactive effect. See id.
62. See id. at 329.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 330. The Court further stated that "different treatments of the two
chapters thus illustrates the familiar rule that negative implications raised by
438
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decision in Lindh is an example where, under the first part of the
Landgraf test, courts are required to look at the legislative history
when analyzing Congress's intent as to the retroactive reach of
the statute.
In Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States,65 decided shortly
before Lindh, the Supreme Court faced the question regarding ret-
roactive applicability of the 1986 amendments to the False Claims
Act.66 Hughes Aircraft concerned a company's incorrect account-
ing audits associated with a federal contract that occurred in
1984.67 The 1986 amendment allowed private individuals to bring
claims on behalf of the government against people who knowingly
submitted fraudulent claims to the government. 8
Under the first part of the Landgraf test, the Court found con-
gressional intent unclear regarding whether the 1986 amend-
ments should apply retroactively or only proactively. 9 Under the
second part of the Landgraf test, the Court inquired whether the
amendment had retroactive effect, which would trigger the judi-
cial presumption against it.7" The Court concluded that the 1986
statute possessed retroactive effect because it deprived the defen-
dant of certain defenses that existed under the statute that was in
effect when the alleged wrongdoing occurred.71 Justices of the
Supreme Court emphasized, as timeless and universal, the princi-
ple that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed
under the law that existed when the conduct took place.72
E. The History of the Supreme Court's Interpretation
of Immigration Statutes
The presumption against retroactivity has also been applied
disparate provisions are strongest when the portions of statute treated differently had
already been joined together and were being considered simultaneously when the
language raising the implication was inserted." Id. In other words, the trail of
language selection during statute's formulation in Congress can be a strong indicator
of the intended reach of the statute.
65. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. U.S., 520 U.S. 939 (1997).
66. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, § 3730(b), 100
Stat. 3153, 3154 (1986).
67. Hughes Aircraft, 520 U.S. at 942-943.
68. See id. at 941.
69. See id. at 946.
70. Id. at 947.
71. See id. at 951-952.
72. See id. at 946 (citing Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 26); see also Kaiser Aluminum &
Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The
principle that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law
that existed when the conduct took place has timeless and universal appeal.").
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to immigration statutes. In 1884, the Supreme Court concluded in
Chew Heong v. United States73 that section 4 of the Chinese
Restriction Act (CRA) did not apply to Chinese citizens who
entered the United States prior to the statute's enactment. 4 Sec-
tion 4 of the CRA required all Chinese laborers present in the
United States to obtain a certificate of a right of reentry in order
to be allowed back into the United States." The petitioner in
Chew Heong was a Chinese national who, after being lawfully pre-
sent in the United States, left for Hawaii in 1881 without
obtaining the requisite certificate of a right of reentry. 6 He
attempted to reenter the United States in 1884, but was detained
at the port of entry due to his failure to produce the said certifi-
cate.77 The Supreme Court concluded that the petitioner relied on
the treaty that regulated travel of Chinese nationals that was in
effect at the time of his departure in 1880.8 The Court stated that
courts uniformly refuse to give statutes a retrospective operation,
where rights previously vested are injuriously affected, unless the
courts are compelled to do so by a clear and positive language of
the statute that such is the intent of the legislature. 9
In 1939, in Kessler v. Strecker,"° the Supreme Court once
again applied the presumption against retroactivity when inter-
preting another immigration statute. In Kessler, the Naturaliza-
tion Bureau denied an alien's application for naturalization and
the Department of Labor initiated deportation proceedings due to
his past membership in a communist party.8 ' The Government
argued that section 1 of the Act of October 16, 1918 allowed for
deportation of any immigrant alien who was found in the past to
be a member of a communist party. 2 The Supreme Court dis-
agreed, stating that the statute only applied to current members
of the communist party." The Court added that the statute,
absent a clear and definite expression that Congress intended for
an alien to be deported if he was ever a member of a communist
73. Chew Heong v. U.S., 112 U.S. 536 (1884).
74. See id. at 554-559.
75. See id. at 539. The CRA was enacted in 1882 and further amended in 1884.
Id. at 538.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 538-539.
78. See id. at 559-560.
79. See id.
80. Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22 (1939).
81. See id. at 23-25.
82. See id. at 26-27.
83. See id. at 30.
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party in the past, could not be applied retroactively.14 Similarly as
in Chew Heong, the Court applied the presumption against retro-
active statutory interpretation in the area of immigration law,
deportation, and aliens' rights.
In Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan,s5 the Supreme Court was called
upon to interpret the reach of another deportation statute. The
statute in question mandated a deportation of an alien who was
sentenced more than once for an imprisonment term of one year or
more.86 The petitioner in Fong Haw Tan was convicted of the
murder of two separate individuals and was sentenced to life
imprisonment for each murder. 7 He was later paroled and
released from prison, after which the Immigration Service initi-
ated deportation proceedings under the aforementioned statute.8
Challenging the deportation, Fong Haw Tan argued that the
deportation statute did not apply to his case because he was sen-
tenced only once for the several crimes he committed. 9 The Court
construed the statute narrowly in favor of the alien and reversed
the deportation proceedings.9 ° Speaking for the majority of the
Court, Justice Douglas described deportation as a drastic measure
equivalent to banishment or exile.91 He further depicted deporta-
tion as a penalty that an alien receives for his misconduct in this
country.92  This harshness that deportation brought about
required the Court to interpret the statute narrowly in favor of the
alien.93
The Court reaffirmed the commitment to interpretation of
deportation statutes in favor of the alien in Costello v. Immigra-
84. See id.
85. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6 (1948).
86. Id. at 8. Section 19(a) of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917 stated that
"any alien who is hereafter sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one year or more
because of conviction in this country of a crime involving moral turpitude, committed
within five years after the entry of the alien to the United States, or who is hereafter
sentenced more than once to such a term of imprisonment because of conviction in
this country of any crime involving moral turpitude, committed at any time after
entry... shall, upon the warrant of the Attorney General, be taken into custody and
deported." Id. at 7 n.1.
87. Id. at 8.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 8-9.
90. Id. at 10.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See id. ("[S]ince the stakes are considerable for the individual, we will not
assume that Congress meant to trench on his freedom beyond that which is required
by the narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used.").
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tion and Naturalization Service.94 Section 241(a)(4) of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act of 19529" provided for the deportation
of any alien who at any time after entry was convicted of two
crimes involving moral turpitude.96 The petitioner was a natural-
ized citizen who was convicted of two separate crimes, both of
which occurred after he was already naturalized. 7 Once again,
the Supreme Court reversed the deportation proceedings and nar-
rowly interpreted the statutory language to exclude the petitioner
from the category of aliens deportable under the statute.98 The
Court held that the statute only applied to crimes that were com-
mitted before the alien was naturalized, which excluded the peti-
tioner from the targeted group.99 The Court stated that even if it
is logical to interpret the statute in a way that would include the
petitioner in a group targeted for deportation, such an interpreta-
tion is not proper due to the harsh consequences that deportation
imposes upon aliens.'01
The Court further expanded the doctrine of statutory inter-
pretation in a way favorable to the alien in Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service v. Errico.1°1 The question before the Court was
the applicability of section 241(f) of the INA to aliens who entered
the United States by misrepresentations in order to evade quota
restrictions.1 1 2 Section 241(f) stated:
The provisions of this section relating to the deportation of
aliens within the United States on the ground that they
were excludable at the time of entry as aliens who have
sought to procure, or have procured visas or other docu-
mentation, or entry into the United States by fraud or mis-
representation shall not apply to an alien otherwise
admissible at the time of entry who is the spouse, parent, or
a child of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence." 3
94. Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120 (1964).
95. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414, § 241(a)(4), 66 Stat. 163,
204 (1952).
96. See Costello, 376 U.S. at 121.
97. Id. at 121-122.
98. See id. at 122, 128.
99. See id.
100. Id. at 128.
101. See INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214 (1966).
102. Id. at 215.
103. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. 87-301, sec. 16, § 241(f), 75 Stat.
650, 655-56 (1961) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 1251, sec. 16, § 241(f)) (current
version at 8 U.S.C.S. § 1227 (1996)).
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Specifically, the issue was whether aliens who misrepresented
their occupation in order to evade quota restriction were consid-
ered as "otherwise admissible" aliens under the statute. 10 4
Despite a strong dissent from three Supreme Court Justices
who argued that a solution of statutory interpretation in favor of
the alien would create a reward for fraud,"5 the majority of the
Court sided with the petitioners.' While interpreting the statu-
tory vagueness in favor of the alien, the Warren Court considered
the social implications that an opposite interpretation would
bring.0 7 Given the severity of the consequences that a different
interpretation would bring about, the Court relied on the Fong
Haw Tan doctrine and concluded that only a clear and unambigu-
ous statement from Congress can bring out such serious and broad
results.108
Finally in 2001, the Supreme Court faced the issue of retroac-
tive effect of the IIRIRA in Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice v. St. Cyr."°9 Section 304(b) of IIRIRA 1 eliminated the right
to a discretionary petition for waiver of deportation proceedings,
available under section 212(c) of the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Act."' The petitioner in St. Cyr. was admitted to the United
States as a lawful permanent resident in 1986.112 Ten years later,
he pled guilty in a state court to a charge of selling a controlled
substance, a conviction that made him deportable.1 3 Because the
deportation proceedings did not start until April 1997 after
104. Errico, 385 U.S. at 216-217.
105. Id. at 230 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 225.
107. See id. at 224-225.
108. See id. at 225.
109. See generally INS v. St. Cyr., 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
110. Illegal Immigration Reform & Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, § 304(b), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 597 (1996) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§1252a(b)(4)).
111. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. 414, § 212(c), 66 Stat'. 163, 187
(1952). Section 212(c) has been interpreted by the Board of Immigration Appeals to
authorize any permanent resident alien with a lawful un-relinquished domicile of
seven consecutive years to apply for a discretionary waiver from deportation. St. Cyr,
533 U.S. at 295 (2001). If relief was granted the deportation proceeding was
terminated and the alien remained as a permanent resident. Id. The extension of
section 212(c) relief to the deportation context had great practical importance because
deportable offenses have historically been defined broadly. Id. Thus, the class of
aliens whose continued residence in the United States depended on their eligibility
for section 212(c) relief was extremely large. Id. at 295-296. Additionally, a
substantial number of applications for section 212(c) relief have been granted. Id. at
296.
112. Id. at 293.
113. Id.
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IIRIRA took effect, the question before the Court was whether the
provision of IIRIRA, which eliminated the right to apply for dis-
cretionary relief from deportation, applied retroactively to defend-
ants who were convicted of a crime prior to IIRIRA's enactment.
1 14
The Supreme Court concluded that under the second part of
the Landgraf test, IIRIRA's elimination of any possibility of sec-
tion 212(c) relief for people who entered into plea agreements with
the expectation that they would be eligible for such relief, clearly
attached new disability with respect to transactions or considera-
tions already past.'15 Absent any indication that Congress
intended for the statute to have such retroactive effect, the Court
stated that section 304(b) of IRIRA could repeal the availability
of section 212(c) relief only to aliens who pled guilty after IIRIRA's
enactment. 116
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Supreme Court's Failure to Interpret
Congressional Intent
The Supreme Court majority in Fernandez-Vargas concluded
that under the common principles of statutory interpretation, sec-
tion 241(a)(5) of IIRIRA is not clear as to the scope of its applica-
tion. 7 Under the first step of the Landgraf test, the Court only
addressed the absence of the "before or after" clause in the newly
enacted statute."' The Court refused to look into the legislative
history of IIRIRA in Congress, including Congress's rejection of
the express retroactive language from section 241(a)(5).
The Court's refusal to address the history of section 241(a)(5)
was a clear departure from its prior history of analyzing legisla-
tive intent."9 Previously, the Court stated that few principles of
statutory construction are more compelling than the proposition
that Congress does not intend to enact statutory language that it
had earlier discarded in favor of other language. 120 Removal of
language from the draft rule is a signal that Congress did not
intend the effect of the rejected language.'2 ' Nonetheless, despite
114. Id.
115. Id. at 321.
116. See id. at 325.
117. Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. 2422, 2430 (2006).
118. See id. at 2428-2430.
119. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
120. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 442-43 (1987).
121. Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 324-28 (1996). There, the Court analyzed
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this precedent, the Court refused to look at Congress's express
rejection of the "before or after" clause from the initial draft.
Given the present controversy surrounding immigration issues,
the Court's approach in deciding this case was not surprising. By
failing to find Congress's clear proactive intent, the Supreme
Court decided to play it safe. Had the Supreme Court found con-
gressional intent, the public may have seen the Court as attempt-
ing to curtail immigration reforms.
B. The Supreme Court's Refusal to Find Section
241(a)(5) as Having Impermissible Retroactive
Effect
Upon failing the first part of the Landgraf test, the Court pro-
ceeded to the second part of the test to determine if the statute
had a disfavored retroactive effect.'22 Courts disfavor retroactivity
when it impairs the rights a party possessed when they acted,
increases a party's liability for past conduct, or imposes new
duties with respect to transactions already completed.'23 After
concluding that section 241(a)(5) did not penalize an alien for the
act of the reentry into the United States, but rather for his or her
continuous presence, the Court found the statute had no disfa-
vored retroactive effect and upheld the statute's retroactive
application.'24
The Court's reasoning under the second part of the Landgraf
test is inconsistent with its prior holdings in immigration cases.
Specifically, the Court has consistently recognized the harsh con-
sequences that are associated with deportation and the effect that
it has on people that are subjected to it. 12' Absent clear congres-
sional intent, the Court has constantly refused to give a deporta-
tion statute retroactive effect. The Court's distinction that section
241(a)(5) is designed to punish an alien's continuous presence in
the country rather than the initial act of reentry is not convincing
the intent of Congress as to the scope of prejudice requirement under the newly
enacted habeas statute. Id. It concluded that "Congress, when considering a draft of
the Rule ... directly focused upon the prejudice requirement and rejected, by
removing from the draft Rule, a provision that would have eased the burden of the
prejudice requirement by presuming prejudice after a delay of five years." See id. at
327.
122. See Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2430-31.
123. Id. at 2427-28 (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994)).
124. See id.
125. See generally Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120 (1964); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan,
333 U.S. 6 (1949).
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because the Court overlooks the consequences associated with
deportation.
When an alien decides to enter the United States illegally, he
or she arguably does so after carefully considering the pros and
cons associated with such illegal behavior. The possibility of an
adjustment of status through marriage to an American citizen is
one of the factors that likely plays into this analysis. The possibil-
ity of such an adjustment, however, is usually not available to the
alien immediately upon arrival; it requires time and physical
presence in the United States, as the alien must establish him or
herself both financially and socially. Few, if any, illegal immi-
grants enter this country with the financial and social skills nec-
essary to find a potential spouse. From this perspective, it is
difficult to see the distinction between the act of entry and the act
of continuous presence in the United States, as this continuous
presence is a prerequisite to the possibility of an adjustment of
status through marriage.
Retroactivity is most problematic when it upsets a stable
equilibrium.'26 The longer a rule is in effect, and the more time
people have had to build their lives around that rule, the more
disruptive it will be if the government is permitted to reach back
and alter it.' 2' This is the type of retroactive effect that section
241(a)(5) has on aliens who illegally reentered prior to IIRIRA's
enactment. Prior to IIRIRA, an alien who resided in the United
States appeared to have the possibility of an adjustment of status
through marriage to an American citizen. So it is difficult to
accept the Court's reasoning that section 241(a)(5) has no retroac-
tive effect when one looks at a person like Mr. Fernandez-Vargas.
He lived and built his life in the United States for nearly fifteen
years under a law that allowed an adjustment of status through
marriage. The possibility of an adjustment of status encouraged
his continuous illegal presence in the United States, and thus
application of section 241(a)(5) retroactively impaired the rights
that he possessed when the illegal act was carried out.
121
Another concern that retroactive legislation poses, which the
126. See Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due
Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 137 (1998) (citing Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and
Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1105-06 (1997)).
127. See Morawetz, supra note 126, at 137.
128. Even if one accepts the Court's distinction that section 241(a)(5) punishes the
present illegal act of actual presence in the United States, an alien's reliance on pre-
IIRIRA's possibility of an adjustment of status gives section 241(a)(5) impermissible
retroactive effect.
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Court in Fernandez-Vargas never addressed, is the potential for
such legislation to target unpopular groups or individuals for
abuse.129 Limitations on retroactive legislation curb such arbi-
trary and potentially vindictive legislation."' The immigrant pop-
ulation has a long history of existing as a disfavored group, and
politicians use them as a convenient scapegoat for many of
America's problems.' The Court failed to recognize the limited or
almost non-existent representation of immigrant groups' interests
in Congress. While legislation is usually drafted after careful
debate and consideration of all possible negative effects, construc-
tion of immigration laws tend to be conducted without such close
scrutiny.'32
It appears that the central problem and flaw in the Court's
reasoning under the Landgraf test is the test itself. The Landgraf
test acknowledges that a statute may operate retroactively in one
of two ways: due to legislative intent for its retroactive application
expressly stated in the statutory language, or due to the statute's
effect or impact when it is applied in certain situations. 33 In
either instance, a court should not accord the statute retroactive
effect absent clear congressional intent favoring such results.3
However, it appears that the impact of a statute's retroactive
effect can be subject to differing interpretations.133 Any change in
the law has retroactive effect in the sense that it disturbs existing
legal relationships and expectations. 36 It appears that almost all
legislation is unable to escape some level of retroactive analysis. 37
Despite Landgrafs instruction that a statute will not have
retroactive application absent an indication of clear congressional
intent, this safeguard dissipates if a court declines to define a stat-
ute as having a retrospective effect in the first instance. 38 The
Supreme Court's jurisprudence has considered several factors in
analyzing the retroactivity of civil legislation.'39 Failing to
acknowledge the full panoply of these considerations resulted in
129. See Tsesis, supra note 16, at 106-07.
130. See Morawetz, supra note 126, at 137.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 141-47.
133. See Debra Lyn Bassett, In the Wake of Schooner Peggy: Deconstructing
Legislative Retroactivity Analysis, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 453, 503 (2001).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 504.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 505.
139. Id.
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the Court's inability to convincingly reconcile its retroactivity
decisions in Landgraf.14° This appears to be the case in Fernan-
dez-Vargas as well, where the result reached under the Landgraf
test is totally inconsistent with its prior decisions regarding depor-
tation statutes.
Determination of retroactive effect is just one of the two ambi-
guities in retroactivity jurisprudence.14 1 Properly applied, fairness
is a critical limiting factor in retroactivity.12 When the Supreme
Court's retroactivity jurisprudence is reviewed in its entirety, it
becomes clear that the Court generally has considered three fac-
tors in determining whether to give civil legislation retroactive
effect.'
The first factor is a traditional statutory interpretation issue,
where the Court examines the legislation's plain meaning for con-
gressional intent.'44 The second factor involves an inquiry regard-
ing whether the statute is subject to constitutional constraints
found in the Contracts, Takings, and Due Process Clauses.145
Finally, the third factor is composed of the principles of fairness,
encompassing a wide range of consideration, including equity, jus-
tice, and reliance.46
Applying these three factors, there are six potential scenarios
involving retroactivity: (1) the statute expressly indicates its ret-
roactive intent and there are no constitutional or fairness con-
straints to implementing the statute retroactively, which results
in retroactive application; (2) the statute expressly indicates its
retroactive intent, but that intent cannot be implemented due to
constitutional or fairness constraints, which results in only pro-
spective application; (3) the statute has an identifiable retroactive
effect, the statute indicates a clear intent favoring that result, and
there are no constitutional or fairness constraints to implement-
ing the statute retroactively, which results in retroactive applica-
tion; (4) the statute has an identifiable retroactive effect, the
statute indicates a clear intent favoring that result, but that




143. Id. at 506.
144. See id. (citing United States v. Heth, 7 U.S. 399, 413 (1806) (requiring a "clear,
strong, and imperative" expression of intent by the legislature to give the statute
retroactive application)).
145. See Bassett, supra note 133, at 506-07.
146. See id. at 507.
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constraints, which results in only prospective application; (5) the
statute has an identifiable retroactive effect but the statute does
not indicate a clear intent favoring that result, which according to
Landgraf results in only prospective application; (6) the statute
has an identifiable retroactive effect, but the court declines to rec-
ognize that effect, which results in de facto retroactive
application."'
Landgrafs analysis is incomplete with regard to constitu-
tional and fairness concerns. 14 The Landgraf decision properly
noted the constitutional restraints upon retroactive legislation but
it sent mixed messages with respect to considerations of fair-
ness. 49 Fairness is the concept that gives rules legitimacy.15 ° Our
country was founded on a system where the judiciary serves as a
check on the legislative and executive branches. Deferring to con-
gressional desire to impose a new rule retroactively, without scru-
tinizing whether the new rule violates principles of fairness, is
expedient, but it is a process by which courts abdicate their consti-
tutional responsibilities. 5'
The fairness inquiry should include analysis of the possibility
of disproportionate burden, disproportionate impact, discrimina-
tion, arbitrariness, and unreasonableness.52 Fairness should
equate with equity and justice.'53 Looking at the facts in Fernan-
dez-Vargas, it is clear that section 241(a)(5) fails the fairness
aspect of the retroactivity test. As Justice Stevens points out in
his dissent, the government has changed the rules mid-game.'
At the time of Mr. Fernandez-Vargas's entry, and for the next 15
years, the enacted laws motivated him to remain in the United
States continuously, to build a business, and to start a family.' 5
However, the Court's interpretation of section 241(a)(5) appears to
render all these activities irrelevant in the eyes of the law. 56 The
burden that the retroactive application of section 241(a)(5)
imposes on aliens clearly violates the fairness aspect of the retro-
activity inquiry.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 508.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 513.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 515.
153. Id.
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C. The Supreme Court's Holding Has Devastating
Effects on American Families
Preservation of the family has historically been a priority of
the American culture.157 The Supreme Court has often recognized
the importance of the family institution to society.'58 In past
cases, when faced with a housing ordinance that forbade more
than one grandchild from living in one home, the Court rejected
the law and stated that the Constitution protected the sanctity of
the family, an institution that is deeply rooted in the America's
history and tradition.159 On another occasion, the Court pointed
out that the history and culture of Western civilization reflected a
strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbring-
ing of their children. 60 The primary role of the parents in the
upbringing of their children appeared to be established beyond
debate as an enduring American tradition. 6'
Throughout its history, the Supreme Court has also empha-
sized the importance of marriage in American society. In the cele-
brated decision of Loving v. Virginia, which declared state laws
barring interracial marriages unconstitutional, the Court stated
that freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men.'62 Yet in Fernandez-Vargas, the Court appears to ignore
this fundamental personal right of marriage. The Court's igno-
rance of this aspect and retroactive application of IIRIRA deprives
Fernandez-Vargas's wife, who is an American citizen, of this very
fundamental right.'63
American citizens are the most protected members of our soci-
ety and their constitutional rights deserve the utmost protec-
tion." Congress should not be allowed unlimited deference when
157. See Tsesis, supra note 16, at 154.
158. See id.
159. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) ("It is though
the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral
and cultural.").
160. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
161. Id.
162. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967).
163. Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. 2422, 2427 (2006).
164. See Linda Kelly, Preserving the Fundamental Right to Family Unity:
Championing Notions of Social Contract and Community Ties in the Battle of Plenary
Power versus Aliens' Rights, 41 VILL. L. REV. 725, 778-779 (1996) (citing T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 9,
20-21 (1990); David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National
Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PIr. L. REV. 165, 208 (1983)).
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citizens' rights are at stake.165 Historically, the Government has
been held to strict scrutiny when the law infringed on citizens'
fundamental rights. 6 Nevertheless, although the Supreme Court
has recognized the importance of marriage in immigration cases,
it has refused to give serious consideration to an American citi-
zen's fundamental right to marry and to marital privacy when a
non-citizen is involved. 67 Justice Marshall has criticized the
Court's approach in dealing with immigration marriage cases by
pointing out that when Congress grants a fundamental right to all
but an invidiously selected class of citizens, it is clear that such
discrimination would be intolerable in any other context but
immigration. 6 '
Immigration laws that limit and interfere with fundamental
rights of family unity should be reevaluated and repealed.'69
Although people experience many joys, all of them are not qualita-
tively the same.17° One of the greatest qualitative pleasures is
that which accompanies being with family members. 7' They are a
source of strength, wisdom, comfort, joy, and support.7 2 Commu-
nion with family develops interpersonal skills that translate into
an ability to communicate with people outside the family unit.'73
Strong families that respect the rights of others are models of rela-
tionships that make it easier to communicate and compromise
with our fellow countrymen.'74 Mutual respect by fellow country-
men increases social welfare, happiness, and tranquility.'75 Many
immigration laws, such as section 241(a)(5), have the opposite
effect, creating less familial and social harmony. 76
The majority of the Court in Fernandez-Vargas failed to rec-
ognize the large presence of immigrants in American families.
Nine percent of all American families with children are composed
165. Kelly, supra note 164, at 778.
166. See id. at 779-80 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 204-
205 (1995) (holding that the federal government is held to the same standard of strict
scrutiny as state and local governments when racial classifications are involved)).
167. See Kelly, supra note 164, at 776.
168. Id. at 778 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 816 (1977) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)).
169. Tsesis, supra note 16, at 159-60.
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of families where at least one parent is an immigrant.'77 This
includes immigrants that have either legal or illegal status, as
well as those immigrants that adjusted their status through mar-
riage to an American citizen.178 Seventy percent of New York's
undocumented immigrant-headed households with children con-
tain native-born citizen children.7 9 This empirical data shows
that decisions dealing with the scope and reach of immigration
laws, such as Fernandez-Vargas, have broad spillover effects on
American families and American citizens.1 80
At the time when there is a large debate about preserving
family values and marriage, such as legally defining marriage as
between a man and a woman,' the public seems to ignore how
immigration laws such as IIRIRA pose a real threat to American
families. Mr. Fernandez-Vargas has been separated from his wife
and child, both American citizens.8 2 His wife, a homemaker with
few job skills, and son, an asthmatic, were dependent on him for
financial support.8 3 The Supreme Court did not address the nega-
tive impact that the Court's interpretation of section 241(a)(5) has
on American families by dividing married couples and separating
children from their parents. This and other immigration laws cre-
ate the possibility of placing families in the difficult position of
being separated from one parent and having to raise children on a
single-parent income.8
4
177. Michael E. Fix & Wendy Zimmermann, All Under One Roof. Mixed-Status





181. See generally Richard G. Wilkins, Welcome to Defend Marriage!, http:/!
defendmarriage.org/defendmarriage/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 12, 2007) (explaining
the "threat to marriage and the family posed by the aggressive effort to legalize same
sex marriage .... Strong families have always been the essential foundation of every
successful society. And for millennia, traditional marriage, defined as a union of a
man and a woman, has been essential to the creation and protection of strong
families. Legalizing same sex marriage would change forever the role that marriage
plays in our society, undermining it and the family.").
182. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 12, at 40.
183. Id.
184. Bekiares, supra note 14, at 739 (discussing the negative impact of 8 C.F.R.
§ 245.1(c)(8) (2006) on American families, which prohibits an arriving alien in
removal proceedings from adjusting his status).
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D. The Supreme Court's Faulty Reliance on Old Legal
Fiction in Treating Deportation as a Civil
Proceeding
Perhaps the biggest flaw in the Supreme Court's reasoning is
its adherence to the old tradition that deportation proceedings are
not a criminal process or punative.'8 5 Constitutional deportation
doctrine that developed in the late nineteenth century was prima-
rily a form of extended border control."8 6 Despite its often harsh
practical effects, these deportation laws generally fit well within
traditional civil and regulatory models."7 Over the years, how-
ever, the Supreme Court has treated deportation proceedings as a
civil proceeding through the use of this legal fiction.88
Legal fiction is a doctrine that embraces an array of modes of
communication ranging from figures of speech and metaphors, to
distortions or lies.8 9 It is the falsity itself that makes a statement
or concept fictional. 9' The most familiar uses of legal fiction were
either dictated by the limitations of language in expressing an
idea, or by the need to escape the strictures and formalism of the
common law.191 Legal fiction can be used to escape the duty of rea-
soned analysis, to perpetuate mythologies upon which the law
operates, to mask the true intent and purpose of the communica-
tor, to avoid moral responsibility for decision, or to pursue an
185. Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some
Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1890, 1914
(2000).
186. Id. at 1908.
187. Id.
188. See Ibrahim J. Wani, Truth, Strangers, and Fiction: The Illegitimate Uses of
Legal Fiction in Immigration Law, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 51, 100-101 (1989) (citing INS
v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (exclusionary rule afforded under the Fourth
Amendment is not available because deportation is a civil rather than criminal
proceeding)).
189. Id. at 54-55. As Professor Wani suggests, metaphors, by definition, are not
false because they presume likeness or similarity and are generally only a tool for
enhancing the effectiveness of communication. See id at 54-55 n.16. But they can
also be used to mislead or distort images. See id. For example, when someone says "E
is an elephant," one suggests a likeness between E and an elephant and assumes that
the recipient of that statement is familiar with elephants. Id. If that is true, the
reference to an elephant will immediately color the recipient's perception and she will
begin to conjure up elephant characteristics in thinking about E. Id. This reference
may, however, be an exaggeration because E may only have three elephant
characteristics. Id. The reference can also be a lie because E may, after all, not have
any elephant characteristics. Id.
190. Id. at 55.
191. Id. at 58.
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agenda that is inconsistent with the mainstream of thought. 192
In reviewing prior Supreme Court decisions, it appears that
deportation has been treated as a civil and not a criminal process,
because: (1) its purpose is not to punish but merely to determine
eligibility to remain in the United States; (2) the procedure is held
before an immigration judge whose sole power is to order deporta-
tion; and (3) the immigration judge does not have the authority to
punish or adjudicate guilt related to unlawful entry.93 The civil-
criminal distinction spelled out by the Court is a classic example
of legal fiction." The distinction is fictional. 95 It is the type of
formalism that has long been discarded in constitutional jurispru-
dence because it does not aid constructive decision-making. 96
There is nothing inherent in the nature of a proceeding or
obligation that classifies it as either civil or criminal. 197 Deporta-
tion procedures are legislatively mandated, not due to anything
inherent in the character of a deportation hearing, but as a prod-
uct of unrelated legislative bargaining. 9 Nothing in the legisla-
tive history suggests that Congress took into account the civil or
criminal character or consequence of deportation in designating
the requisite procedures.'99 It appears that the Court declares
deportation as a civil procedure because the Congress decided to
label it as civil.200
It is difficult to comprehend the Court's blindness and refusal
to recognize deportation as a punishment or as a criminal proceed-
ing. This can only be possible if one ignores the reality of involun-
tary removal from home, family and property. 21 Deportation
almost always deprives an alien of his liberty when he is appre-
hended and detained.2 2 There is also a stigma associated with
deportation because it suggests wrongdoing and illegal conduct.20 '
Moreover, deportation is based on past conduct, and like tradi-
tional criminal punishment, it is partly designed to send a mes-
sage to society, particularly aliens, about the utility of compliance
192. Id. at 58-59.
193. Id. at 103 n.282 (citing INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1044-45 (1984)).






200. Id. at 103-04.




2007] IMMIGRATION LAW RETROACTIVITY
with the immigration laws.2 °4
The legal fiction of labeling deportation proceedings as civil
and not criminal is probably the main reason behind the illogical
and socially destructive holding in Fernandez-Vargas. Classifying
deportation proceedings as criminal would bar the government
from retroactive application.2"' Where other fictions shift and
reform to accommodate changing views, century old fictions still
rule immigration law10 6 and, as exemplified in Fernandez-Vargas,
bring about unjust results.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonza-
les came at the height of the immigration debate and the nation's
dissatisfaction with current immigration policy. In order to avoid
the public's scrutiny, the Court turned its head and relied on a
legal fiction to achieve a result that would satisfy the majority of
the public. In some ways, this decision is reminiscent of other
infamous Supreme Court rulings where the majority of the Court
ruled contrary to justice and equality in order to satisfy public
sentiment.
The impact of this decision on American families is devastat-
ing. The democratic process will hopefully mitigate the absence of
rationality on the part of the judiciary. Seeing the negative
impact that section 241(a)(5) will have on American families and
public will hopefully force Congress to either amend or repeal the
statute. Fernandez-Vargas is another example of the govern-
ment's attempt to treat immigrants in this country as a class pos-
sessing little constitutional protections. Being a voiceless political
class in American society, immigrants will continue to be the vic-
tims of irrational decisions and policies from all three branches of
our government. In the absence of such a rational voice, the possi-
bility of creating a sound immigration policy in the United States
remains slim.
204. Id. at 105.
205. See Harold J. Krent, The Puzzling Boundary Between Criminal and Civil
Retroactive Lawmaking, 84 GEO. L.J. 2143, 2146-2147 (1996) (citing Calder v. Bull, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798)).
206. Wani, supra note 188, at 53.
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